Is CEO human capital related to firm performance? by Hutchinson, Marion & Russell, Mark
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted/accepted for pub-
lication in the following source:
Hutchinson, Marion R. & Russell, Mark (2013) Is CEO human capital re-
lated to firm performance? In EAA 2013 : European Accounting Associa-
tion 36th Annual Conference, 2-5 May 2013, Paris, France.
This file was downloaded from: http://eprints.qut.edu.au/60038/
c© Copyright 2013 Please consult the authors
Notice: Changes introduced as a result of publishing processes such as
copy-editing and formatting may not be reflected in this document. For a
definitive version of this work, please refer to the published source:
 
0 
 
 
 
 
Is CEO Human Capital Related to Firm Performance? 
 
 
Abstract: 
The global economy experienced continuous growth from 2002 to 2007 until the U.S. 
subprime mortgage crisis caused instability in worldwide stock markets. Simultaneously, 
global CEO turnover continued to fall to 13.8 percent in 2007. In contrast, the CEO turnover 
rate in Australia increased to 18 percent in 2007. The purpose of this paper is to determine 
under what conditions a change in a CEO is associated with firm performance. Succinctly, 
does the firm’s decision to replace the CEO depend on the CEO’s human capital or firm 
performance?  The empirical study of Australian listed firms (2005 – 2008) shows that firm 
performance is not a determinant of CEO turnover, rather a CEO with less valuable human 
capital is more likely to be replaced. The study also finds that merely changing the CEO is 
not associated firm performance. Rather, there is a positive association between firm 
performance and the successor’s general human capital for firms that replace the CEO.  
Specifically, it is the internal successor’s general human capital that is an important 
determinant of increasing firm performance. These results are important because they imply 
that CEO turnover is a result of a more active market for CEOs and contributes to explaining 
why firms retain CEOs despite poor firm performance.     
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1. Introduction 
Firms make investments in human capital with a view to make the business successful and 
increase the probability of survival (Syverson, 2010). Human capital is defined as expertise, 
experience, knowledge, and skills and other acquired traits that contribute to the 
organisation’s production and business processes (Goode, 1959; Becker, 1964) and can 
increase through education and experience.  Research has proceeded to categorise human 
capital into general and firm-specific (e.g. Becker, 1964; Wulf and Singh, 2011). However 
defined, it is generally held that human capital is vitally important for organisational success 
(Crook et al., 2011). 
In this paper, human capital theory is used to explain the association between CEO turnover 
and firm performance. CEOs represent important assets to the firm to the extent that they 
represent valuable human capital that can enhance firm performance. Their expertise may 
stem from their general or firm-specific human capital which provides the basis for building 
long-term firm value (Wulf and Singh, 2011). In attempting to discern whether it is the 
CEO’s human capital or firm attributes that affects firm performance we need to isolate their 
effects.  This is particularly difficult in a cross-sectional study. One of the best opportunities 
to isolate the effects of CEO and firm attributes is to study a firm’s performance around a 
CEO change. To address this issue, two streams of research are merged in this paper.  
Research that attempts to determine whether a change in CEO is associated with firm 
performance (e.g. Chen and Hamrick, 2012) and the relationship between human capital and 
firm performance in general (see Crooke et al., 2011) and CEO characteristics and firm 
performance in particular (see Kaplan et al., 2012). Consequently, the aim of this paper is to 
determine whether a change in CEO is associated with their human capital and under what 
circumstances a change in CEO increases firm performance.   
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The study of CEO turnover remains an important research topic particularly in wake of the 
global financial crisis when risk is high and performance at the firm level is critical. The 
decision to retain or dismiss an incumbent CEO is one of the most important decisions made 
by the board. In Australia in 2008, over 20 percent of CEOs from the top 200 ASX listed 
companies left the firm, a record high. This is a stark contrast to the U.S and Europe where 
CEO departures declined over the same period (AICD, 2010)1. However, in 2011, 14.2 
percent of CEOs of the world’s top 2,500 companies were replaced.2 As CEO turnover has 
been increasing since 2000 (Kaplan and Minton, 2012) it is obviously important to determine 
whether the change in CEO has any significant consequences for the firm. The importance of 
the CEO managerial skills and anecdotal evidence of firm performance motivate the 
investigation of the antecedents and consequences of CEO turnover. 
There is little, if any, research that unequivocally demonstrates that the human capital of the 
CEO determines the success or failure of the firm. Chang, Dasgupta and Hilary (2010) note 
that there is surprisingly little direct evidence whether CEOs contribute positively to firm 
value. Empirically, Chang et al., (2010) find that the stock price reaction upon CEO departure 
is negatively related to the firm’s prior performance and to the CEO’s prior pay. Chang et al 
(2010) view their results as consistent with the notion that cross-sectional differences in firm 
value and performance is related to differences in a CEO’s ability. This view is consistent 
with Lieberman et al., (1990) who find significant CEO fixed effects on productivity in the 
US and Japanese automobile industries.  
In this study, firm performance before and after a change in CEO is examined. Prior to a 
change in CEO, firm are expected to underperform earlier results. After CEO turnover, it is 
                                                          
1http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-Director-
magazine/Back-editions-2010/February-2010/February/Feature-When-the-CEO-isnt-up-to-scratch 
2 Favaro, K., Karlsson,P.O., and Neilson, G., 2012, ‘CEO Succession Report’, Booz & Company Inc., USA, 
page 3.  
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posited that an improvement in firm value depends on the human capital of the CEO 
successor. The results of this study demonstrate the importance of CEO human capital. First, 
the study shows that for the sample of Australian firms (2005-2008) that CEO general human 
capital is positively associated with firm performance while CEO firm specific human capital 
is negatively associated with firm value.  Contrary to expectations, poor performance is not a 
significant antecedent of CEO turnover. Rather, CEOs with less valuable human capital are 
more likely to be replaced. Testing the consequences of a change in the CEO shows that a 
turnaround in firm performance depends on the successor’s general human capital rather than 
their firm-specific human capital. Finally, this study demonstrates that it is the internal 
successor’s general human capital that is an important determinant of the performance 
turnaround. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several meaningful ways. First, the study reconciles 
the burgeoning research on CEO turnover by comparing the antecedents and consequences of 
CEO change in a sample of Australian firms. The Australian CEO labour market is much 
smaller than the US and UK and the market is typically less active (Suchard et al, 2001).  
Twenty years ago, most Australian CEOs came up through the ranks of their company and 
external appointments were rare. The switching costs were very high because if the CEO 
moved to another company and was not successful the chances of getting another 
appointment were slim (Kerin, 2003). Consequently, academic research on CEO change in 
Australia is sparse. This study is the first to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
antecedents and consequences of CEO change in Australia in the period leading up to the 
global financial crisis. Second, the study contributes to the literature on the human capital 
determinants of firm performance. This study refocuses the CEO turnover and firm 
performance literature away from the monitoring and dismissal of poor performing managers 
toward attraction and retention of managers with valuable human capital. The study provides 
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a basis for additional research into the implications of CEO replacement. More specifically, it 
highlights the potential of extending the research into executive human capital to the 
exploration of the antecedent and consequences of CEO turnover, particularly by considering 
general and firm-specific human capital. 
2. Background and hypotheses development 
2.1 Human Capital 
To be an effective administrator, CEOs require a combination of managerial skills (Katz, 
1974) also referred to as the human capital of the CEO (Harris and Helfat, 1997). The general 
human capital of a CEO includes managerial skills critical in leading a complex modern 
corporation but not specific to any organization while their firm specific human capital 
includes skills, knowledge, contacts, and experience valuable only within the organization 
(Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007). General human capital is valued by all potential employers 
and remains with the individual as the costs are generally borne by the individual, not the 
firm (Becker, 1964). Firm-specific human capital is expertise derived from the skills and 
knowledge gained in the position and increases the future marginal product of the firm. The 
value of firm-specific human capital remains with the firm3 and the rights to the profits 
generated from investing in human resources belong to the firm (Abdel-khalik, 2003). 
Research suggests that the firm value of human capital increases as it becomes increasingly 
firm specific and, to retain its value and the associated performance advantage, competitors 
must not be able to purchase the resource (Crook et al., 2011; Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv, 
2005). 
                                                          
3 Abdel-khalik (2003: 665) suggests that “the fair value of the firm’s claim to human-capital assets would be 
estimated like any other asset by the present value of its expected contribution to the firm’s future earnings. This 
value would be estimated based on cash flows to be earned by the firm, not the individual.” 
 
5 
 
Another stream of research suggests that CEOs’ general human capital has increased in 
importance over firm-specific human capital (Bertrand, 2009; Frydman, 2007; Murphy and 
Zabojnik, 2007).  As a consequence of economic uncertainty and globalisation, CEOs have 
become increasingly focused on externalities, requiring sophisticated corporate and 
marketing strategies. The CEO must be proficient in economics, management science, 
accounting, finance, and other disciplines. Subsequently, there has been a change in 
importance from firm-specific human capital to general human capital (Bertrand, 2009; 
Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007). Frydman (2007) provides evidence of the rise of general skills 
over firm-specific skills for CEOs over the past 30–40 years by demonstrating the rise in 
importance of educational and professional skills.  Similarly, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) 
find an increase in CEO appointments with an MBA degree (13.8 percent in the 1970s to 28.7 
percent in 1990s). These general skills are transferrable between organisations and increase 
the elasticity of supply for the labour market for CEOs. 
Prior research on human capital in the accounting field has mainly investigated the 
association between human capital disclosures and various factors such as the value relevance 
of such disclosures (e.g. Wyatt, 2008), the types of firms that voluntarily make human capital 
disclosures (e.g. Whiting and Woodcock, 2011), the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on human capital disclosures (e.g. Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2012; Li, Pike and 
Haniffa, 2008), and  how the stock market reacts to human capital disclosures (e.g. Cormier, 
Aerts, Ledoux, and Magnan, 2009).  Investigations of the consequences of human capital 
investments in the accounting literature is limited and includes the relationship between 
human capital and compensation (e.g. Abdel-khalik, 2003; Marchetti and Stefanelli, 2009; 
Murphy and Zabojnik, 2007), and firms’ R&D spending (e.g. Dalziel, Gentry and Michael 
Bowerman, 2011).  
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After over two decades of researching the association between human capital investment and 
firm performance in the management field, there remains no unequivocal evidence of a strong 
association. Crook et al. (2011: 444) suggest that the difficulty in finding a definitive 
association between human capital and performance is due to three moderating factors. First, 
cross-sectional analysis is unlikely to show any significant effect as the return on human 
capital investment is likely to take time to eventuate. The second factor relates to the failure 
of prior research to separate the effects of the transferability of human capital. Human capital 
that is readily tradeable in the capital market (e.g. general managerial skills and experience) 
can move between competitors, demanding higher salaries so that their costs equal the value 
added to the firm. In contrast, firm specific human capital is not as transferrable, so that the 
value is retained in the organisation. Finally, the profits generated by human capital may be 
appropriated by the individuals with the human capital in the form of higher wages. Crook et 
al.’s (2011) meta-analysis of 66 studies in the management literature find human capital is 
related to firm performance but only under certain conditions. When the human capital is not 
readily tradable in labour markets (that is, when it is related to firm specific skills) and when 
performance is not operationalised by profit measures.   
Examining the motivation and corollary of CEO turnover has increased in importance 
especially given the recent corporate governance scandals4 and the global financial crisis5.  In 
2008, Australian boards initiated 20 of the 50 CEO departures in the ASX 200 companies, 
mainly from the financial services and property trust industries (AICD, 2010)6. To gauge 
                                                          
4 It has been alleged that Aubrey McClendon, the founder, CEO and Chairman of Chesapeake Energy, took 
advantage of the company by making personal investments in the Chesapeake wells while thousands of the 
company’s shareholders lost money.  http://247wallst.com/2012/07/17/americas-worst-boards/ 
5 Nokia CEO, Stephen Elop, admitted that his company’s failure to foresee rapid changes in the mobile phone 
industry was partly the cause of the firm's problems. Nokia recently lost the world number one ranking it had 
held for 14 years and its share price fell to its lowest point since August 1996.  
http://gadgets.ndtv.com/mobiles/news/nokia-ceo-admits-failure-to-foresee-fast-changing-industry-237252 
6 http://www.companydirectors.com.au/Director-Resource-Centre/Publications/Company-Director-
magazine/Back-editions-2010/February-2010/February/Feature-When-the-CEO-isnt-up-to-scratch 
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whether CEO human capital is associated with firm performance we need to test an event that 
shows an observable change in the CEO.  Such an event is found when the CEO leaves the 
firm. 
2.1 Antecedents of CEO turnover 
Poor firm performance has been cited as a major cause of CEO turnover (e.g. Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985, Warner et al., 1988) and essential for performance recovery as poor firm 
performance is indicative of ineffective leadership, especially when major strategic and 
organizational changes are required (Chen and Hamrick, 2012). There is considerable 
research that finds that a firm is more likely to dismiss the CEO when experiencing poor 
performance (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1980; Jenter and Kanaan, 2012; Kaplan and Minton, 
2012).  
Although the majority of research finds a significant inverse relationship between CEO 
turnover and firm performance, using either accounting or stock-based performance 
measures, the results are economically small (Brickley, 2003). Brickley (2003: 228-229) 
suggests that this is because the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is better 
explained by CEO and firm characteristics. Characteristics such as: CEO age and stock 
ownership, board monitoring, concentrated stock ownership, firm size and whether the 
appointment is internal or external are alleged better determinants of CEO turnover.  
The board may dismiss the incumbent CEO when it believes the CEO lacks the necessary 
skills to improve firm performance (Shen and Cannella, 2002). Conversely, firms 
experiencing poor performance may choose to retain the CEO based on the CEO’s general 
and firm specific human capital. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) suggest that the trend towards 
external appointments is not driven by companies replacing poorly performing CEOs but 
depends on the elasticity of the labour market for CEOs. Although Jenter and Kanaan, (2012) 
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find that boards only partially filter industry and market performance so that too many CEOs 
are dismissed in bad times, it is contended that the decision to dismiss or retain the CEO is 
based on their human capital.  
In this study, it is suggested that the decision to change or retain the CEO following poor firm 
performance is determined by their human capital.  Given that general and firm-specific 
human capital are important to the success of the firm (Crook et al., 2011; Murphy and 
Zabojnik, 2007), CEO’s with high human capital are less likely to be replaced.  A CEO with 
firm specific experience and general human capital, which is increased through education and 
other acquired traits (experience), is less likely to be replaced than a CEO that is new to the 
firm and has little experience as a CEO. This leads to the first hypothesis. 
H1: CEO turnover is negatively related to CEO human capital. 
 
2.1.1 CEO turnover and firm performance  
Research investigating the consequences of CEO turnover on firm performance typically 
finds that certain factors are associated with the success or otherwise of the change. Whether 
the succession is planned or forced, or internal or external appointments are purported to 
affect firm performance. 
CEO appointments can be the result of normal succession (planned) such as a retiring CEO. 
In a survey of the top 200 ASX listed firms7, planned transitions in Australia (planned 
retirements, acceptance of a CEO position elsewhere, health-related departures or death in 
office) increased from 7.5 percent in 2006 to 10.5 percent in 2007 and 59 percent of CEO 
successors in 2007 were internal appointments (Manning and Sherwood, 2007).  
                                                          
7 The survey identified 40 Australian companies within the ASX 200 that had experienced CEO turnover events 
in 2007. 
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Research has investigated whether a change in CEO is associated with a turnaround in 
performance (e.g. Chen and Hambrick, 2012; Evans et al 2010; Huson, Malatesta, and 
Parrino, 2004). However, the results of the predominantly event studies are not consistent.  
Although the majority of the events studies show that investors react positively to a change in 
CEO, there is very little direct association between CEO turnover and subsequent firm 
performance (Huson, et al., 2004: 239). This is because a positive turnaround in performance 
following CEO change depends on the CEO successor’s human capital. 
Huson et al., (2004) find that deteriorating firm performance8 from three years to one year 
before the turnover year triggers management turnover and performance increases 
significantly from one year before to three years after the turnover year. They suggest that 
this result refutes the notion that observed firm performance improvements are attributable to 
mean reversion of accounting performance time series9 but are related to management 
turnover and improved managerial quality. The determinants of a positive turnaround in 
performance following CEO change used in previous research include whether the 
replacement is an internal or external appointment and the monitoring mechanism of the firm 
(Huson et al., 2004). Chen and Hamrick (2012) suggest that a successful turnaround in firm 
performance depends on how well the CEO successor’s competencies fit current contextual10 
requirements. This line of research is extended by suggesting that a successful turnaround in 
performance also depends on CEO human capital.  
If CEOs are homogeneous, then poor performance would be the result of bad luck, not bad 
management. Consequently, a CEO who is dismissed following poor performance is treated 
as a scapegoat and subsequent performance should revert to the mean (Huson et al., 2004). 
                                                          
8 Performance is measured as average, unadjusted, industry-adjusted, and control group-adjusted ROA 
9 Because successions occur disproportionately in low performing firms, performance increases after 
successions; however, these improvements are due to regression-to-the-mean. CEO succession has no effect 
after controlling for prior performance (Chen and Hambrick, 2012). 
10 E.g. in the context of a turnaround, performance severity, or industry problems.   
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However, human capital theory suggests that CEOs are not all the same and research 
provides the evidence. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) track the same top managers across 
multiple firms over time and find significant heterogeneity in investment and financial 
decisions and operating performance. They also find, older managers are more conservative 
and those with an MBA are more aggressive. Accordingly, a turnaround in performance 
following a CEO change depends on the successor’s human capital.  This leads to the second 
hypothesis: 
H2: A positive turnaround in performance following CEO change is associated with the 
successor’s human capital.  
 
2.1.2 CEO successor  
Organisational disruption is less likely when a CEO retires as succession plans and the 
managerial implications of a change in the CEO are in place before the retirement. The 
internal successor may be selected and groomed by the outgoing CEO (Shen and Cannella, 
2002) so that they maintain the status quo and hence maintain firm performance. 
Consequently, appointing an internal successor following CEO retirement is unlikely to have 
any significant impact on firm performance.   
When deciding to replace a CEO the board may choose an outside appointment. If the 
successor is an external appointment, a change in performance is expected, premised on the 
notion that the firm makes the external appointments based on their general human capital 
and because there is no internal successor with sufficient firm-specific skills to make a value-
added strategic change. Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) argue that a successor’s general human 
capital may be more important than firm-specific human capital when making outside 
appointments.  They argue that, if the market for CEOs is relatively elastic, an increase in the 
 
11 
 
relative importance of general human capital will lead to fewer internal and more external 
appointments.  They suggest that the increase in the relative importance of general human 
capital is reflected in the increased trend in making appointments of external CEOs11 with 
prior CEO experience (Elsaid, Wang and Davidson, 2011) and the subsequent increase in 
CEO remuneration.  Consequently, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) suggest that the trend 
towards external appointments is not driven by companies replacing poorly performing 
CEOs.  A more active market for CEOs emerges as general skills become more valuable and 
firms compete for general human capital (Bertrand, 2009; Frydman 2007; Murphy and 
Zabojnik, 2007). 
Although, outside appointments lack firm-specific human capital, it is expected that the board 
will choose a successor based on the value of their general human capital (Murphy and 
Zabojnik, 2007; Parrino, 1997).  This leads to the third hypothesis. 
H3: A change in performance following the appointment of an external successor depends on 
the successor’s general human capital. 
 
3 Research Methodology 
3.1 Firm performance surrounding CEO Turnover 
The paper first uses an event-study methodology to examine changes in firm performance in 
the years surrounding the year of CEO turnover, from year t-1. Suchard et al. (2001) tests the 
relationship between CEO turnover and poor performance in Australia and find that poor 
stock market return has a lagged effect (t-1) on CEO turnover and board independence 
positively influences the sensitivity of the CEO turnover–performance relationship but only 
in large firms.  However, their small sample study (59 firms) was carried out in 1989-1995 
                                                          
11 External CEO appointments trend upwards: 14.9% (1970s), 17.2% (1980s), 26.5% (1990s), and 33% (2000-
2005) (pages 1-2).  
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which was before the introduction of Australia’s corporate governance recommendations in 
2003.  
The measures of firm performance used in the probit model to determine if CEO turnover is 
due to poor performance (stage one of the analyses) are earnings per share, return on assets 
and total shareholder returns. Firm’s earnings per share (EPS) is used because managerial 
risk-taking is likely to influence EPS, it is a common performance measure amongst all firms 
thus allowing comparability and it has been used by prior research (e.g. Doucouliagos, 
Haman and Askary, 2007; Luo, 2003). Return on assets (ROA) which is net income plus 
interest expense multiplied by (1-corporate tax rate)] divided by [total assets - outside equity 
interests] is a common measure of firm performance (e.g. Huson et al., 2004). Total 
shareholder return or return on common stock consists of the [year-end closing price of a 
firm’s stock + dividends per share] divided by the share price of the previous year.  This 
measure reflects the one-year total gain (loss) a shareholder receives for holding the firm’s 
common stock (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998).   
In the second stage of the analysis, firm performance is measured as the market value of the 
firm divided by the replacement value of assets (Tobin’s Q).  The study of human capital 
evolved from the broader concept of intellectual capital which includes human capital, 
organizational capital and customer capital. Human capital research is a means of explaining 
the growth of unrecognized intangible assets as demonstrated by increases in market-to-book 
ratios (Abdel-khalik, 2010). Tobin’s Q, is an accounting based measure but includes the 
market’s assessment of the investment opportunity set and future cash flows of the firm 
(Carter et al., 2010).  Consequently, this measure is appropriate for measuring the intangible 
value of CEO human capital. 
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This study adopts a simple measure of Tobin’s Q as adopted by Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996).  The market value of the firm is the market value of equity (total number of issued 
shares by the ordinary share price at year-end) and debt (total of short and long-term debt).  
The replacement value of the firm’s assets is the book value of total assets.  This simple 
measure of Tobin’s Q is adopted because it is highly correlated (0.93) with the traditionally 
inflation-adjusted figures and ease of computation. 
 
3.2 OLS Regression Models 
The hypotheses are tested in two stages. First, a probit regression model is used to investigate 
the cross-sectional determinants of CEO turnover as the outcome variable is categorical.  
CEO Turnover Model  
itnjt
n
itmtii
Industry
ControlsePerformancLagCapitalHumanCE
µα
αααα
+Σ+
+++=
1
210 __OCHG
 (1) 
CEOCHGi,d = CEO change is an indicator variable equal to one on the 
appointment of a CEO for firm i in financial year t, and 
equal to 0 otherwise.  
Human Capitali,d  = Human Capital is measured using four different variables 
as described in Section 3.4: CEO tenure, CEO 
compensation, qualifications and age. 
  Firm specific human capital = Tenureti and is the number 
of years as CEO of firm i at fiscal yearend t.   
  General human capital = CEO total remuneration 
includes salary and fees, cash, non-monetary benefits, 
superannuation and share based payments in financial 
year t; Age is measured in years; qualification is the 
number of degrees and professional qualifications held 
by the CEO 
Lag_Performancei,t = EPSt-1 ; ROAt-1 ; TSR  t-1.  The performance of the firm in 
the year prior to CEO change. 
CEOCHR = dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is also the chair; 0 
otherwise. 
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Industry = dummy variables  representing S&P GICS industry level 
classifications of the stock for year t. 
   
 
3.3 Firm Performance Model 
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are formally investigated using random effects generalised least square 
(GLS) regression estimated with clustered-robust (also referred to as Huber-White) standard 
errors to control for any serial dependence in the data (Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor, 2010; 
Petersen, 2009). The results of the Hausman test determine that a random effect GLS 
regression model is appropriate to test the panel data. Panel data is often cross-sectionally and 
serially correlated, thereby violating the common assumption of independence in regression 
errors (Gow et al., 2010). Hence, clustered standard errors are unbiased as they account for 
the residual dependence (Petersen, 2009). 
3.3.4 Heckman Two-Equation Model 
Human capital is potentially endogenous. The choice of CEO is determined by human 
capital characteristics: gender, age, background, experience, wealth and salary. The problem 
of selection bias arises whenever there is non-random sampling such as in this case where 
CEO selection and retention are driven by firm governance, performance and economics, 
creating a non-random sample of CEO appointments. The two-stage Heckman (1976) 
procedure is used to control for problems of potential endogeneity and omitted variables. 
First, the Inverse Mills Ratio (INVMILL) is computed (Heckman 1976; Johnston and 
DiNardo 1997) from a probit model that predicts CEO change.  The INVMILL ( λˆ ) 
coefficient is then used as an additional control variable to account for the omitted variable 
and self-selection bias in the stage 2 models. This method to correct for self-selection bias is 
especially robust in cases where the two sets of variables are not the same (one used for the 
probit model and the other to determine the effect of CEO change on firm performance).  
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Firm Performance = TOBQti, TOBQt+1, TOBQt+2. The value of the firm in the 
year of the CEO change and 2 years subsequent to the 
change. 
CEOCHGi,d = CEO appointment is an indicator variable equal to one on 
the appointment of a CEO for firm i in financial year t, 
and equal to 0 otherwise.  
Human Capitali,d  = Human Capital is measured using four different variables 
as described in Section 3.4: CEO tenure, compensation, 
and age. 
  Firm specific human capital = Tenureti and is the number 
of years as CEO of firm i at fiscal yearend t.   
  General human capital = CEO total remuneration includes 
salary and fees, cash, non-monetary benefits, 
superannuation and share based payments in financial year 
t; Age is measured in years; qualification is the number of 
degrees and professional accounting qualifications held by 
the CEO at t. 
External 
appointment 
= An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is an 
external appointment, and equal to zero otherwise.  
External 
appointment* 
Human Capitali,d 
= Interaction term  
INVMILL = Inverse Mills Ratio. Results of Heckman (1978) two-
equation model 
Lag_Performancei,t =  TOBQt-1.  The performance and value of the firm in the 
year prior to CEO change. 
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3.4 Human Capital Measurement 
The human capital literature identifies a number of characteristics and factors that are 
associated with CEO human capital: experience, tenure, compensation, age, risk preference, 
and personal wealth (Abdel-khalik, 2003; Wulf and Singh, 2011). 
The value and human capital of a CEO are not fully observable; therefore, past studies use a 
number of observable proxies. The labour-market measure of CEO compensation is an 
indication of the value of the human capital that the CEO brings to the firm. Firm specific 
skills generate rents which firms can to retain the CEO or as an incentive to encourage future 
investments in firm-specific skills (Harris and Helfat, 1997; Abdel-khalik, 2003; Wulf and 
Singh, 2011).  
Experience is another indicator of human capital, measurable by age for general experience 
and CEO tenure for firm-specific experience (Abdel-khalik, 2003). The performance 
implications of CEO turnover of long tenured CEOs are that there is less likelihood of 
causing organizational instability while CEO turnover of shorter tenured CEOs means they 
have less time to implement profit making strategies. CEO age is also associated with CEO 
turnover. Young CEOs are dismissed more often than CEOs approaching retirement 
(Weisbach, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Also included is CEO education, including 
bachelor degrees, post graduate degrees and professional accounting qualifications (e.g. 
CPA) as education is a means of increasing general human capital and has increased in 
importance over the last 30-40 years (Frydman, 2007). 
Abdel-khalik (2003) constructs a measure of managerial skills for executives on boards based 
on personal variables and firm-specific variables. Experience, risk preference and personal 
wealth are personal variables that contribute to general human capital. Performance, 
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organisational complexity and operating risk are firm-specific variables.  Abdel-khalik finds 
proxies of these managerial skill variables value-relevant.  
Neither theoretical nor empirical studies provide much guidance with regard to which CEO 
characteristics and abilities are important for corporate performance (Kaplan, et al., 2012: 
973). Consequently, a factor score for general human capital is developed using a principal 
components analysis of the three individual measures of CEO general human capital12. CEO 
tenure is excluded from the factor analysis due to the theoretical justification mentioned 
above, that is, tenure relates to firm specific human capital. In addition, small values in the 
structure detection factor analysis indicate that CEO tenure does not fit well with the factor 
solution and should be dropped from the analysis. Using a factor score is attractive because it 
extracts a component that is common to the three CEO characteristics. 
Dummy variables for internal and external successor CEO are used to examine whether 
changes in firm performance for subsamples of internal and external CEO successors are 
dependent on their human capital. CEO appointments are typically categorised as insiders 
(executives promoted within the firm) and outsiders (appointments from other organisations). 
Organisation and strategy researchers assume that internal appointments are made in good 
times while external appointments are made when performance is poor or a strategic change 
is deemed necessary (Shen and Cannella, 2002).13 
External successor is interacted with their human capital as prior research suggests that a 
turnaround in firm performance depends on whether the successor is internal or external 
                                                          
12 CEO age, compensation and qualifications. 
13 Planned succession is an adaptive event that leads to improved performance. Forced or unplanned succession 
is a disruptive event for the group with negative consequences on performance. The ‘‘ritual scape-goating’’, 
blaming the CEO for poor performance out of his/her control, suggests that succession is independent of firm 
performance (Shen and Cannella, 2002). 
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(Huson et al., 2004) and the value of their general human capital (Murphy and Zabojnik, 
2007; Parrino, 1997). 
 
3.5 Rationale for Selected Control Variables 
3.5.1 CEO Turnover Model 
Beyond human capital, a number of factors influence the CEO replacement or retention 
decision. Different industries have different talent pools and are arguably associated with 
CEO replacement since many CEOs are hired from firms in the same industry (House, Singh 
and Tucker, 1985). The CEO is less likely to be replaced when the CEO also holds the 
position of chair of the board as research shows that CEO duality is associated with CEO 
power (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
3.5.2 Factors Affecting Firm Performance 
A large number of factors influence firm performance in addition to CEO human capital 
(Capon Farley and Hoenig, 1990). However, a parsimonious model is used by controlling for 
past firm performance and firm size (Huson et al, 2004).  The inverse mills ratio controls for 
factors that are likely to be associated with CEO turnover.   
3.6 Sample selection 
The sample consists of an unbalanced data set of 326 firms (1151 firm year observations) 
listed on the Australian Securities Exchange from 2005-2008. Archival data on firms’ CEO 
characteristics is hand collected from the company annual reports from Connect4. Financial 
variables are provided by Aspect FinAnalysis.  
Results 
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4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In untabulated results, four hundred and five of the sampled firms replaced the CEO of which 
33 percent were internal successors and 25 percent were external successors (170 firms did 
not report whether the successor was internal or external). The outgoing CEO held the 
position on average for 4.7 years (minimum 0.12 years: maximum 34 years) with an average 
age of 52 years (minimum 29 years: maximum 74 years). Of the 210 firms that disclosed why 
the CEO was changed, 79 (37.6 percent) cited change of position and the rest stated that the 
CEO left the firm (55 percent). Where the CEO stayed in the firm, the replacement CEO in 
more than half the cases was from within the firm (57 percent14). This pattern was similar 
when the CEO left the firm (62 percent were internal CEO successors15). These results are 
consistent with the 2007 global study of CEO succession by Manning and Sherwood (2007). 
Of the 20 CEO changes that were due to takeovers, 55 percent of the CEOs stayed in the firm 
in a different position.  
Table 1 reports the results of testing whether there are significant differences between the 
firm characteristics of firms that changed the CEO with other firms in the same period. 
Preliminary tests comparing the means of CEO change and non change firms using an 
independent t-test shows that CEO human capital in firms that changed the CEO is 
significantly different to the non-change firms for CEO age (younger), total remuneration 
(lower) and MBA qualification (fewer).  The results also show that CEO change firms have 
lower EPS, ROA and TSR while TOBQ is significantly higher in the year of the CEO 
replacement. Similar to the AICD (2010) survey the study finds that CEO change firms are 
predominately in the materials, utilities, financial and industrials industries. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                                          
14 Eight percent of firms did not disclose whether the replacement was internal or external. 
15 Nine percent of firms did not disclose whether the replacement was internal or external. 
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The results of the principal components factor analysis of CEO general human capital are 
reported in Table 1. The extracted components explain nearly 76% of the variability in the 
original three variables thus reducing the complexity of the data set, with only a 24% loss of 
information. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
Following the preliminary univariate tests, multivariate tests are used to determine the 
antecedents and consequences of CEO turnover by testing the three hypotheses. The results 
of the first stage of the analysis using a probit panel regression with clustered standard errors 
is reported in Table 3 Panel A. The results show that CEO change is negatively and 
significantly associated with CEO’s firm specific human capital (B = -3.572; p<0.001) and 
marginally significant for general human capital (B = -0.573; p<0.10). Consequently 
hypothesis 1 is supported.  Performance (EPSt-1 or ROAt-1) is not significantly associated 
with CEO change while TSR is only marginally associated with CEO change. Supporting 
these findings, Murphy and Zabojnik (2007) suggest that CEO replacements are not driven by 
poor performance. The results also show that when the CEO is also the chair of the board 
they are less likely to be replaced. 
The consequences of a CEO change on firm performance, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are tested by 
analysing the association between human capital and firm performance16. First, the full 
sample is used to determine whether there is a significant association between CEO human 
capital and firm performance. The results reported in Panel B of Table 3 show that, after 
controlling for factors associated with CEO change (MILLS), CEO’s general human capital is 
positively and significantly associated with TOBQ for the current and the following two 
years after CEO replacement.  CEO firm specific human capital is negatively associated with 
                                                          
16  Crook el al., (2011) suggests that studies using profit as a performance measure typically fail to find a 
significant association between human capital and firm performance. 
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performance in years one and two although marginally significant in year two.  This result 
suggests that CEO’s firm specific human capital does not add to firm value. As the proxy for 
firm specific human capital is CEO tenure and long-tenured executives are often viewed as 
cognitively constrained, possessing limited perspectives on future strategies and investment 
opportunities (Chen and Hambrick, 2012) it is plausible that CEO tenure is negatively 
associated with TOBQ. Similar to Chen and Hambrick (2012) this study finds that CEO 
replacement itself has no effect on subsequent firm performance. 
 However, these results do not resolve the problem of isolating the CEO effects from firm 
effects on performance.  Hence, we turn our attention to the firms that replaced their CEO to 
determine if a change in CEO has an impact on firm performance. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
The results reported in Table 4 Panel A support the proposition; a turnaround in performance 
for firms that change their CEO depends on the successor’s human capital (Hypothesis 2). 
Controlling for the lag of performance, factors that are associated with CEO change and 
testing only the firms that changed the CEO, the results show a significant and positive 
association between TENUREt and TOBQ in the year the CEO is replaced. Research shows 
that executive tenure is associated with strategic persistence (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990) and commitment to the status quo. Consequently, replacing the incumbent CEO with a 
CEO with firm specific human capital improves the chances of a successful turnaround but 
only in the year of replacement. In contrast, a positive and significant association between 
general human capital (HCFACTOR) and TOBQ does not occur until two years after the 
CEO replacement.  However, the results in Panel B, show a positive association between 
general human capital and firm performance for the current year and for two years after the 
replacement when the interaction term is included in the model.  Lambertides (2009) suggest 
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that investors may interpret the appointment of an external successor as a signal of the firm’s 
intention to remain adaptive or they may expect outsiders to serve their interests more than 
insiders. However, the results for the sample of Australian firms show that the successor’s origin 
(internal or external appointment) is not significantly associated with TOBQ. 
Finally, the analysis tests whether a change in performance depends on the external 
successor’s human capital.  The results reported in Table 4 Panel B show that it is not the 
external successor’s human capital that is important for the CEO change firms. Rather it is 
the internal successors general human capital that is associated with increasing TOBQ, 
starting in the second year after appointment (B = -0.619; p < 0.05).   The CEO successor’s 
firm specific human capital (as proxied by CEO tenure) is not significantly associated with 
performance.  These results demonstrate that the evidence on the consequences of CEO 
replacement decisions is ambiguous.  
Huson et al. (2004) suggest that CEO replacement implies improved management and higher 
cash flows subsequent to the change. Consequently, firm value (Tobin’s Q) should increase 
following CEO turnover. However, Shen and Cannella (2002) suggest that a change in 
performance is unlikely with the appointment of an internal successor as they tend to 
maintain the status quo. Nevertheless, neither study considered the successor’s human capital.  
 The sample used in this study shows that CEO succession in Australian firms is close to an 
equal proportion of internal and external appointments which is consistent with Manning and 
Sherwood’s (2007) study.  In the period under examination there is an active market for 
CEO’s, consequently, investors may be inclined to value internal appointments general 
human capital over their firm specific human capital because general CEO skills demonstrate 
the internal successor’s strategic adaptability and hence their aptitude for generating future 
investment opportunities and cash flows.  Therefore, when the incumbent CEO is replaced 
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with an internal successor with valuable general human capital there is an increase in firm 
value measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
4 Conclusion 
This study provides some illumination towards the importance of CEO human capital in an 
environment of increasing CEO turnover.  Contrary to prior studies, poor performance is not 
a significant explanatory factor of CEO turnover. It is posited that this is a consequence of the 
incumbent CEO’s human capital and this notion is supported by the results of the study. That 
is, CEOs with less valuable human capital are more likely to be replaced. This result supports 
prior research that suggests that CEO turnover is a result of a more active market for CEOs as 
general skills become more valuable and firms compete for general human capital rather than 
replacing the CEO when firm performance is poor (Bertrand, 2009; Frydman 2007; Murphy 
& Zabojnik, 2007).  This is particularly interesting given that historically the labour market 
for CEOs in Australia has been less active than the US and UK. 
In examining the consequences of CEO turnover, the results show that a turnaround in firm 
performance following a change in CEO depends on the successor’s human capital.  Finally 
this study demonstrates that it is the internal successor’s general human capital that is 
associated with increasing firm performance. The results suggest that investors value internal 
appointments general human capital because general CEO skills demonstrate the internal 
successor’s ability to take advantage of strategies that generate future investment 
opportunities and cash flows.  Therefore, when the incumbent CEO is replaced with an 
internal successor with valuable general human capital there is an increase in firm value. 
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A limitation of the study is that poor performance and improvement can also be explained by 
luck and economics, rather than a consequence of CEO change. In a competitive 
environment, profitability and the rate of firm return on investment are mean reverting 
within, as well as across, industries (Nissim and Penman, 2001). Subsequently, future 
research could address the possibility that firm performance surrounding CEO turnover 
follows a mean reversion of returns. 
In summary, the study provides a foundation for additional inquires into the implications of 
CEO replacement. More broadly, it highlights the promise of extending research on executive 
human capital into other areas, particularly by considering the contribution of general and 
firm-specific human capital. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Means for CEO change and non-change firms. 
  CEOCHG N Mean t 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
CEOAGE 1.00 176 48.400 -6.927 0.000 -4.369 
 .00 1016 52.7697       
CEOTOTREM 1.00 219 665769 -3.047 0.002 -386022 
 .00 980 1051791       
CEOCHR 1.00 225 0.116 -0.854 0.393 -0.021 
 .00 1052 0.137       
BACHELOR1 
Bus/acc/finance/econ/commerce 1.00 225 0.240 1.043 0.297 0.032 
 .00 1017 0.209       
BACHELOR2 
Engineering/science/geology 1.00 257 0.409 -0.986 0.324 -0.034 
 .00 1062 0.443       
BACHELOR3 
arts/psych/law 1.00 250 0.108 1.473 0.141 0.029 
 .00 1061 0.079       
CA/CPA/FCA 1.00 245 0.127 1.978 0.048 0.041 
 .00 1061 0.086       
POSTGRAD1 
Law/arts/business masters/grad 1.00 254 0.083 0.609 0.543 0.011 
 .00 1062 0.072       
POSTGRAD2 
Science/eng/masters/postgrad 1.00 258 0.109 -1.233 0.218 -0.029 
 .00 1062 0.138       
OTHER 
Diploma/associate dip/certif 1.00 225 0.018 -1.849 0.065 -0.027 
 .00 1016 0.044 
   MBA 1.00 221 0.116 3.671 0.000 0.102 
 .00 1061 0.137       
TA 1.00 307 946625156 -0.516 0.606 -108898596 
 .00 1027 1055523752       
MKTCAP 1.00 373 710399202 -1.895 0.058 -476447176 
 .00 1038 1186846379       
EPSt 1.00 305 3.783 -4.337 0.000 -10.745 
 .00 1003 14.528       
EPSt-1 1.00 395 7.712 -1.707 0.088 -2.693 
 .00 1062 10.404 
   EPSt+1 1.00 395 7.396 -2.851 0.004 -5.563 
 .00 1062 12.958 
   EPSt+2 1.00 394 8.702 -2.883 0.004 -6.697 
 .00 1062 15.399 
   TOBQt 1.00 336 5.480 2.234 0.026 2.953 
 .00 1030 2.527 
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TOBQt-1 1.00 385 2.286 -0.604 0.546 -0.150 
 .00 1075 2.436 
   TOBQt+1 1.00 302 2.277 -0.677 0.498 -0.140 
 .00 1005 2.417 
   TOBQt+2 1.00 385 2.207 0.599 0.550 0.151 
 .00 1075 2.056 
   TSRt 1.00 385 3.070 -2.304 0.021 -0.846 
 .00 1075 3.916 
   TSRt-1 1.00 262 3.592 -2.421 0.016 -1.227 
 .00 802 4.819 
   TSRt+1 1.00 312 3.045 -2.852 0.004 -1.008 
 .00 944 4.053 
   TSRt+2 1.00 312 3.229 -1.695 0.090 -0.676 
 .00 944 3.905 
   ROAt 1.00 298 -.165 -1.763 0.078 -0.076 
 .00 1026 -.089       
ROAt-1 1.00 308 -.183 -4.177 0.000 -0.117 
 .00 1013 -.066       
ROAt+1 1.00 297 -.302 -4.837 0.000 -0.220 
 .00 955 -.082       
ROAt+2 1.00 297 -.331 -3.605 0.000 -0.225 
 .00 955 -.106       
ENERGY 1.00 395 .073 0.572 0.568 0.008 
 .00 1062 .065       
IT 1.00 395 .094 1.669 0.095 0.026 
 .00 1062 .068       
MATERIALS 1.00 395 .195 -4.929 0.000 -0.131 
 .00 1062 .326       
UTILITIES 1.00 395 .081 3.703 0.000 0.046 
 .00 1062 .035       
FINANCIALS 1.00 395 .109 3.400 0.001 0.051 
 .00 1062 .057       
HEALTHCARE 1.00 395 .147 1.287 0.198 0.025 
 .00 1062 .122       
CONS-STAPLES 1.00 395 .066 1.594 0.111 0.021 
 .00 1062 .045       
CONS-DISCR 1.00 395 .124 1.060 0.289 0.019 
 .00 1062 .105       
INDUSTRIALS 1.00 395 .094 -3.781 0.078 -0.076 
 .00 1062 .173       
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CEOCHG = dummy variable, 1 if the firm changed the CEO in the current year and 0 otherwise; CEOAGE = 
age of the current year CEO; CEOTOTREM = CEO total remuneration includes salary and fees, cash, non-
monetary benefits, superannuation and share based payments; CEOCHR =  dummy variable 1 if the CEO is 
also the chair, 0 otherwise; TENUREYEARS = the number of years the current CEO has held the position;  
TA = total assets $AUS; ROAt = current year Net Income + Interest Expense*(1-Corporate Tax Rate)]/[Total 
Assets - Outside Equity Interests; MKTCAP = calculated by multiplying the number of common shares by the 
current price; EPS = Reported net profit after tax, less outside equity interests and preference dividends 
divided by diluted weighted number of shares outstanding during the year; BACHELOR1, BACHELOR2, 
BACHELOR3, CA/CPA/FCA, POSTGRAD1, POSTGRAD2, MBA, OTHER = Dummy variables for 
general human capital; ENERGY, IT, MATERIALS, UTILITIES, FINANCIALS, HEALTHCARE, 
CONSUMER-STAPLES, CONSUMER-DISCRETIONARY, INDUSTRIALS = Dummy variables for 
industry;  MODIFIED JONES ACCRUALS = measures of earnings management. 
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Table 2: Common factor analysis of the measures of general human capital  
 
 
Panel A: Estimated communalities of three measures of general human capital 
 Initial Extraction 
ALL DEGREES/QUAL 1.000 0.786 
CEOAGE 1.000 0.677 
CEOTOTREM 1.000 0.806 
Panel B: Eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix  
Component 
Eigenvalues 
Total  
 
Cumulative 
%  
ALL DEGREES/QUAL 1.213 40.445 
CEOAGE 1.055 75.626 
CEOTOTREM 0.731 100.000 
Panel C: Correlations between the common factor and three general human factor measures 
  
FACTOR SCORE 1.00 
ALL DEGREES/QUAL 0.152*** 
CEOAGE 0.504*** 
CEOTOTREM 0.902*** 
ALL DEGREES/QUAL = summation of bachelor, postgraduate and accounting 
qualifications; CEOAGE = age in years; CEOTOTREM =  CEO total remuneration 
includes salary and fees, cash, non-monetary benefits, superannuation and share based 
payments 
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Table 3: Random effects GLS regressions with cluster robust errors 
 
 PANEL A 
(Stage 1) PANEL B (Stage 2) 
 
 
CEOCHG- 
probit model TOBQt TOBQt+1 TOBQt+2 
 
predict Coef (z) Coef(z) Coef.(z) Coef.(z) 
cons  2.248 11.91 105.417 48.059 
 
 (3.65)*** (4.17) (2.46)** (2.00)* 
HCFACTOR -/+ -0.278 0.371 0.117 0.249 
 
 -(1.82)! (1.99)! (2.01)* (3.77)*** 
TENUREt -/+ -1.854 0.007 -0.056 -0.031 
 
 -(5.41)*** (0.41) -(2.12)* -(1.76)! 
LNTA ?/- 
 
-4.602 -2.200 -3.110 
 
 
 
-(3.31)*** -(3.39)*** -(4.42)*** 
EPSt-1 - 0.001 
  
 
 
 (0.37) 
  
 
ROAt-1 - -0.126 
  
 
 
 -(0.70) 
  
 
TSRt-1 - -0.026 
  
 
 
 -(1.73)! 
  
 
CEOCHR - -0.854 
  
 
 
 -(2.86)** 
  
 
TOBQt-1 -/+ 
 
0.507 0.417 0.410 
 
 
 
(12.77)*** (5.98)*** (3.95)*** 
CEOCHG - 
 
-0.188 -0.100 0.344 
 
 
 
-(0.88) -(0.68) (1.50) 
INVMILLS ? 
 
4.346 -176.52 -69.96 
 
 
 
(0.99) -(2.33)* -(1.66)! 
INDUSTRY ? Not signif. 
  
 
No# observations  881 1011 1116 1104 
No #firms  320 326 325 325 
Wald chi2  58.23*** 262.93*** 290.36*** 123.09*** 
R2  0.679 0.389 0.349 0.283 
P<0.001***; p<0.01**; p<0.05*; p≤ 0.10! 
CEOCHG = dummy variable, 1 if the firm changed the CEO in the current year and 0 otherwise; 
TOBQt (t+1; t+2) = the market value of equity and debt divided by the book value of total assets in year 
t share for the current year, one year after and two years after the CEO change;  HCFACTOR = factor 
score for 3 general human capital characteristics; TENUREt = Tenure of the CEO  in the current year; 
LNTA = the natural log of total assets;  EPSt-1= prior year EPS; ROAt-1 = prior year return on assets; 
TSRt-1 = total shareholder return in prior year (current year share price plus dividends per share divided 
by prior year share price); CEOCHR = CEO is also chair of the board; INVMILLS = inverse mills ratio 
computed from the first stage probit panel regression; INDUSTRY = Dummy variables for industry. 
ENERGY, IT, MATERIALS, UTILITIES, FINANCIALS, HEALTHCARE, CONSUMER-STAPLES, 
CONSUMER-DISCRETIONARY, INDUSTRIALS. 
 
 
0 
 
 
Table 4: Random effects GLS regressions with cluster robust errors  for CEO change firms    
 
 
 
PANEL A   PANEL B  
 
 TOBQt TOBQt+1 TOBQt+2 TOBQt TOBQt+1 TOBQt+2 
 
predict Coef.(z) Coef(z) Coef.(z) Coef.(z) Coef(z) Coef.(z) 
cons  5.419 133.07 -17.19 5.71 131.61 -15.44 
 
 (3.11)*** (2.76)*** -(0.39) (3.27)*** (2.77)*** -(0.36) 
HCFACTOR + 0.093 0.060 0.218 0.187 0.146 0.531 
 
 (1.22) (1.07) (2.15)* (1.90)! (1.78)! (3.04)*** 
TENUREt + 0.040 -0.041 0.006 0.034 -0.046 0.005 
 
 (4.29)*** (1.60) (0.21) (3.90)*** -(1.60) (0.24) 
EXTERNAL + 0.226 0.062 0.269 0.139 -0.026 0.333 
 
 (1.27) (0.28) (0.91) (0.75) -(0.10) (0.96) 
HCFACTOR*EXTERNAL + 
  
 -0.152 -0.138 -0.619 
 
 
  
 -(1.48) -(1.21) -(2.05)* 
TENUREt*EXTERNAL + 
  
 0.063 0.063 -0.048 
 
 
  
 (0.66) (1.02) (0.58) 
TOBQt-1 + 0.558 0.351 0.331 0.552 0.345 0.315 
 
 (10.94)*** (6.17)*** (1.93)! (10.55)*** (5.83)*** (1.83)! 
INVMILLS ? 
 
-288.80 55.56 Omitted -225.63 53.23 
 
 
 
-(2.64)*** (0.70) collinearity -(2.66)*** (0.69) 
LNTA ? -1.875 -1.606 -4.976 -1.980 -1.72 -5.141 
 
 -(2.79)*** -(2.63)*** -(3.45)*** -(2.95)*** -(2.80)*** -(3.55)*** 
 
 
  
    
No# observations  294 293 292 294 293 292 
No #firms  131 131 131 131 131 131 
Wald chi2  
 
205.07*** 47.25 253.03*** 221.18*** 46.67*** 
R2  0.396 0.378 0.298 0.399 0.381 0.296 
 
1 
 
P≤ 0.001***; p≤  0.01**; p≤ 0.05*; p≤ 0.10! 
EPSt (t+1; t+2) = Earnings per share for the current year, one year after and two years after the CEO change; TOBQt (t+1; t+2) = the market value of equity and debt 
divided by the book value of total assets in year t for the current year, one year after and two years after the CEO change; HCFACTOR = factor score for 3 general human 
capital characteristics; TENUREt = Tenure of the CEO  in the current year; EXTERNAL = Dummy variable 1if CEO appointment is an external successor; 
HCFACTOR*EXTERNAL/TENUREt*EXTERNAL = interaction term; TOBQt-1= lag performance; INVMILLS = inverse mills ratio computed from the first stage probit 
panel regression; LNTA = natural log of total assets. 
 
